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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LARRY N. HEATH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 15569

SAM L. GALLEGOS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a rear-end collision wherein the appellant's vehicle struck the rear of respondent's vehicle
on a residential street, and the main issue is whether
or not the forward motorist was contributorily negligent
as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, sitting without a
jury, found that the collision was proximately caused by
the appellant, who was the following driver, and that
respondent was not negligent, and awarded damages to
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respondent after dismissing appellant's counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment rendered by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 26th day of December, 1976, a rear-end
collision occurred in the westbound lane of 1750 North
in the West 1600 block of Layton City, Utah (T-6).
The streets were dry, and the weather sunny (T-8).
Respondent stopped at the "yield" sign at 1575 West and
then proceeded westbound, attaining a speed of 15 to
20 m.p.h. in a 25-mile per hour zone

(T-30, L.3-5,9).

Appellant says the speed was 5 to 10 m.p.h., and his
wife opined the speed to be 10 to 15 m.p.h.
T-53, L.4).

(T-58, L. 20;

At the time appellant approached the acci-

dent scene he was overtaking respondent's vehicle and
honked his horn to get respondent to speed up a little,
because the appellant was late for church (T-58, L.24,
26).

The respondent didn't know what was going on and

slowed down (T-58, L.28-30; T-59, L.l).

Then appellant

honked again, and claims that the respondent slammed on
his brakes.

Respondent states he did not make a sudden
-2-
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or emergency type stop, but simply made a normal stop
(T-31, L.6-8). The investigating officer reported that
the respondent came to a sudden stop, but under extensive
cross-examination the officer admitted that he didn't
know whether or not that report came to him from the
respondent or the apellant (T-13, L.4-6; T-15, L.l-5)
Respondent did not represent that he made a rapid stop
when talking to the investigating officer, but the appellant did so represent (T-31, L.26-30 and T-32, L.l).
The investigating officer further testified that at the
time of the collision there were no parked cars on the
right or north side of the street, and that respondent's
car was stopped approximately 24 inches from the north
curb, and that neither car left skid marks (T-10, L.2429; T-7, L.8-16).

At the accident scene it was the

appellant who was belligerant and acting out his frustrations, and there is no evidence that the respondent
was anything but cooperative (T-15, L.23).

There is

nothing to indicate that the respondent acted in retaliation against the appellant in the causation of this
collision.

The witness Dale Wanner stated that he saw

the respondent slowing down and that he saw the appellant

-3-
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simply run .i.nto the rear of the car in front (T-18, L. 27,
et seq.).

Appellant first testified that he had no

recollection of any cars parked on 1750 North in the area
of the collision (T-4, L.l7-26).

Through the progress

of the trial, it became apparent that such testimony was
not in appellant's best interest, and his memory improved
substantially so that by the end of the trial he testified
that there were cars on the side of the road, but he
didn't say which side (T-58, L.28).

Nevertheless, appel-

lant's wife testified that there was room to pass on the
left side after the collision occurred (7-54, L.27), and
appellant's son testified that there were no oncoming
cars (T-58, L.l,2).
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS SUPPORTED
BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE BELIEVABLE EVIDENCE.
Where there is conflicting evidence on any issue,
it is assumed that the trial court believed those aspecLs
of the evidence and the testimony that support his findings.
(1977).

Fillmore City v. Reeve (Utah), 571 P.2d 1316
Consequently, the facts should be viewed in the

light most favorable to the ruling of the trial court,

-4-
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and the findings and judgment should not be disturbed
when they are based on substantial,
missible evidence.
393 (1977).

competen~,

and ad-

Fisher v. Taylor (Utah), 572 P.2d

Appellant says respondent stopped rapidly,

and the police officer so indicated in his report.

How-

ever, the police officer also testified that he didn't
know which party his information came from.

On the

other hand, Dale Wanner, appellant, and respondent testified that the forward vehicle slowed down and then came
to a stop, and respondent further testified that he
applied his brakes and stopped after the second honk
because he thought something might be wrong with his
vehicle or that the appellant was trying to stop him.
In Finding No. 4, the court concluded as a

ma~ter

of

fact "that plaintiff's stop was not sudden or panicky in
the sense that the wheels locked or the type of stop
that would put the defendant in jeopardy had defendant
not been negligent."
Appellant testified that respondent was going extremely slow, and when asked why he didn't pass to the
left of respondent's vehicle he stated there were parked
cars on the roadway that prevented such a move.

However,

this testimony from appellant came at the end of the
-5-
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trial after he had been educated throughout the trial
as to the significance of cars parked on the street,
because as the first witness in the trial he testified
that he had no recollection of cars being parked on the
street in the vicinity of the collision.

Appellant's

son specifically recalled that there were no oncoming
cars, and the investigating officer testified that
there were no cars parked on the right or westbound
side of the street.

Furthermore, appellant's wife

testified that immediately after the collision occurred
she passed to the left of the vehicles involved in the
collision and even came to a stop and adjacent to those
vehicles.

As set forth in Finding No. 2, the court was

justified in believing that "there were no other cars
in the immediate vicinity of the collision, either eastbound or parked on the street".
Though appellant placed respondent's speed at 5
to 10 m.p.h., his wife estimated the speed to be higher,
and respondent estimated his speed to be 15 to 20 m.p.h.
The court was fully justified in determining in Finding
No. 3 that respondent's vehicle attained a speed of approximately 15 m.p.h. prior to the first honk by appellant.
A fair inference to be drawn is that appellant's speed
-6-
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was in excess of 15 m.p.h. as it approached the rear of
respondent's vehicle and honked the first time, and
when appellant observed that instead of speeding up, the
respondent slowed down, he had a duty to adjust the
speed and distance of his car accordingly.
not do so.

But he did

Instead, he continued his speed and ap-

proached even closer to the rear of respondent's vehicle,
and then honked again, and respondent then stopped.

If in

fact there were no parked cars and no oncoming vehicles
as found by the court, why didn't the appellant simply
pass as his wife did immediately after the impact?
POINT II
RESPONDENT'S DRIVING, PRIOR TO IMPACT, WAS
CONSISTENT IVITH THE TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS OF TITLE 41, CHAPTER 6, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED.
All of the witnesses, including appellant, agree
that respondent slowed down before he stopped his vehicle, and the investigating officer

estim~ted

respondent's

vehicle came to a stop approxinately 24 inches from the
north curb. 41-6-SS(b), U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides:
Except when overtaking and passing on the
right is permitted, the driver of an over-

-7-
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taken vehicle shall give way to the right
in favor of the overtaking vehicle on
audible signal and shall not increase the
speed of his vehicle until completely passed
by the overtaking vehicle.
Appellant admits that he was the overtaking vehicle, and his wife's testimony shows there was ample
room to pass on the left of respondent, and there were
no oncoming vehicles, according to appellant's son.
Upon the first sound of the horn, respondent was fully
justified in assuming the vehicle approaching from the
rear would pass, because his vehicle was over toward the
right side of the westbound lane of traffic, and he did
not increase his speed but rather decreased it as an
accomodation to the car approaching from the rear.

At

the second sound of appellant's horn, respondent brought
his vehicle to a stop.

On the other hand, it was the

duty of the appellant to comply with the provisions of
41-6-62(a), U.C.A. 1953 as follows:
The driver of a motor vehicle shall not
follow another vehicle more closely than
is reasonable and prudent, having due
regard for the speed of such vehicles
and the traffic upon and the condition of
the highway.
It was obvious to the appellant after the first
honk that respondent was slowing down, and he had a
duty to adjust the speed and distance of his vehicle
-8-
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accordingly, but instead he simply proceeded closer to
the rear of respondent's vehicle and honked again.

When

appellant failed to pass after the first honk, respondent
checked his rear view mirror, found out who it was honking
at him, and became justly apprehensive and brought his
vehicle to a stop.

In his brief appellant admits that

tail lights actuated by the brake pedal may be considered an adequate signal, as provided at 41-6-70, U.C.A.
1953.

The fact that respondent's vehicle slowed down

after the first honk as admitted by appellant is some
evidence that an appropriate signal was given before
the forward vehicle was brought to a stop, and appellant
observed that fact in sufficient time to make the adjustments that would have avoided the collision, and such is
his burden and duty.

Kight v. Butscher, 90 N.M. 386,

564 P.2d 189 (1977); Apato v. BeMac Transport Co., 7
Ill.App.3d 1099, 288 N.E.2d 683 (1972).
But even if, contrary to the finding of the trial
court, there was a sudden decrease in the speed of respondent's vehicle without any brake lights or signal
of any kind and a decrease is actually observed by the
appellant (as in this case) , he has the same notice that

-9-
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any signal would have imparted if given, and therefore
the failure of the respondent to give such a signal is
not a proximate cause of the collision.

Hallett v.

Stone, 216 Kan. 568, 534 P. 2d 232 ( 1975)
Therefore, the admissions of the appellant constitute the strongest kind of evidence against him.
Whether he perceived the decrease in speed by brake
lights, by a closing of the space between the vehicles,
or by some other means is unimportant.

The fact that

he did perceive it is extremely important, because a
signal froM the respondent would have given him no
better notice than he already had from his own observation,
and appellant connects the slowing of the speed to the
honk he himself gave.

In speaking to this exact point,

the court said in Curtiss v. Fahle, 157 Kan. 226, 139
P.2d 827:
Where the sudden decrease in the speed of a
vehicle is actually observed without a signal,
the party observing the decrease in speed
has the same notice a signal would have
imparted if given at that time, and the absence of a signal cannot be said to have
been the proximate cause of the collision.
It is the general law of the road that a driver
approaching from the rear has a duty to keep a safe
lookout to avoid colliding with the vehicle ahead, and
-10-
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he must take into account the prospects of having to
stop his car suddenly.
172, 350 N.E.2d 219

Glen v. Mosley, 39 Ill.App.3d

(1976); Kight v. Butscher, supra.

Recognition of this general rule was given by the Utah
Supreme Court in Bullock v. Ungricht (Utah), 538 P.2d
190, 191 (1975):
In preface to our analysis of the plaintiff's
contentions, we acknowledge our agreement that
in most cases where one car "rear ends" another
it accords with common sense and experience to
believe that the following car has disregarded
the duty to keep a lookout ahead and keep the
car under control and is, therefore, at fault.
CONCLUSION
Where the evidence is in conflict on any issue,
the trier of fact is the final arbiter.

Appellant has

the burden of proving that there was a sudden stop or
decrease in speed, and failed to convince the trial court
of that fact.

Therefore, the requirements of 41-6-69(c),

U.C.A., do not apply.

But even if a signal was required,

a signal was given, and appellant acknowledges that he
received the signal because he testified that the forward
vehicle slowed down after appellant's first honk.

Being

conscious that the vehicle in front was slowing, appellant's
awareness of that fact would not have been enhanced by
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any additional or other kind of signal given by respondent.

Appellant had a golden opportunity to pass re-

spondent's vehicle, but instead appellant consciously
chose to honk his horn to encourage respondent to increase his speed.

But respondent, not knowing that

appellant was not going to pass, reacted oppositely by
staying at the extrerae right edge of the roadway and
slowing his speed, and then finally determined that he
would stop after the second honk.

After the first honk,

surely appellant must have known that respondent may
~nterpret

a second honk as a requirement to pull over

and stop.

The respondent had a right to be uncertain

and confused, and to bring his vehicle to a normal stop
without further notice to the appellant.
The judgment of the lower court should be sustained and the appeal dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of March,

1978.
BEAN, BEAN & SMEDLEY

·.

/

/.'_{_/.

~;:<C:d/~~~,4/ / __
dA
E. BEAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
190 So. Fort Lane
Layton, Utah 84041
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Respondent's Brief to Brian R. Florence, Attorney at Law,
818 -

26th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401, postage prepaid.
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